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Abstract
In the context of recent GSP changes, especially the Trump Administration’s steps relating to 
certain beneficiary countries, it is timely to assess the effectiveness of this unilateral mechanism. 
In particular, the academic question connected to the impact of the GSP on social development 
and human rights in the beneficiary countries is the key issue. It is also interesting to what extent 
the threat of blocking imports or the withdrawal from the scheme can give rise to policy change re-
garding labour standards. This article aims to analyse the legal basis, and compare the EU’s and the 
US’s GSP labour provisions. The author applies critical reasoning and comparative analysis with 
a view to showing the differences between both countries. She focuses her attention on advantages 
and disadvantages of the GSP schemes—not only those currently in effect in the US and the EU, 
but also from a historical perspective.
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1. Introduction
On October 25, 2019, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) announced that 
the US suspends duty-free treatment of certain Thai products for failure to “adequately 
provide internationally-recognized worker rights.” As a consequence, as from April 25, 
2020, 573 US Harmonized Tariff Schedule line items from Thailand, including all sea-
food, will no longer be subject to duty-free treatment under the Generalised System 
* The project was financed by the National Science Centre in Poland pursuant to the decision num-
ber DEC-2016/21/D/HS5/03849. The project’s registration number is: 2016/21/D/HS5/03849.
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of Preferences (GSP). According to data presented by USTR, the removal of these 
benefits affects about one-third of Thailand’s GSP trade, which totaled $4.4 billion in 
2018 (Ringel 2019). The example illustrates pressure that is exerted by one country on 
another with the use of GSP. Interestingly, sometimes such a solution is perceived to 
have better effectiveness than multilateral social clause (Bronstein 2009, p. 108). In fact, 
the topic is particularly important from the point of view of the trade-labour debate 
given that the opponents of the trade-labour linkage often support the concept of GSP 
as a means of the improvement of standards (Razavi 2010, p. 888).
The objective of the paper is to critically examine and compare the US and the EU 
GSP schemes. To meet this purpose, the article has been divided into four parts, includ-
ing introduction. Part 2 explores the discourse and debate over the US GSP. It focuses 
on the legal basis, and presents advantages and disadvantages of the examined unilat-
eral instrument. Part 3 outlines the EU GSP, also emphasising its legal basis, pros and 
cons. Part 4 includes concluding remarks concerning the comparison between the EU’s 
and the US’s GSP scheme.
2. The US Generalised System of Preferences
2.1. Legal basis
The US GSP program was implemented on January 1, 1976, and authorised under the 
Trade Act of 1974 (19 United States Code Sec. 2461 et seq.), according to which the GSP 
beneficiary status could not be accorded to any country that, inter alia, was communist, 
was uncooperative in international drug control efforts, or was terrorist-abetting. But as 
it soon turned out, these grounds were not enough. Frightening events in the 1970s and 
1980s, including Pinochet’s military dictatorship in Chile (1973–1990), the civil war in 
El Salvador (1979–1992), banana plantations in Honduras, and trade union suppression 
in the maquiladora factories in Guatemala, led to the establisment of a coalition of trade 
unions and civil society organisations. It was aimed at finding a trade-related solution 
on how to hold companies and governments accountable for human and labour rights 
violations (Church Albertson, Compa 2015, p. 475). Thus, under the GSP Renewal Act 
of 1984 other relevant grounds for exclusion from the program were added. One of the 
most important prohibited the President from designating as a GSP’s privileged trading 
partner any country that “has not taken or is not taking steps to afford internationally 
recognized worker rights” to its own workers (Alston 1996, p. 72). “Internationally rec-
ognized worker rights”—as defined by the statute—meant that the US GSP scheme re-
quired privileged countries to uphold the right of association, the right to organise and 
bargain collectively, a prohibition on forced labour, a minimum age for employed children, 
and acceptable conditions relating to minimum wages, work hours and safety and health.
Congressional authorisation of the GSP program expired end of December 2017. Fur-
ther, on March 23, 2018, the President signed into law H.R. 1625 (Public Law, 115–141), 
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the “Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018,”1 which provided full-year federal appro-
priations through September 30, 2018, and included the renewal for the GSP through 
December 31, 2020.
2.2. Pros and cons
The GSP supporters point out its great positive effect on research connected to social 
labelling programs, corporate codes of conduct, child labour, and many other forms of 
international standard setting, monitoring and enforcement of labour regulation. They 
also put emphasis on the fact that the GSP review mechanism has given rise to, inter 
alia, a number of lobbying groups, a global network of unions, human rights organisa-
tions, labour think-tanks, networking organisations, NGOs, and development agencies. 
In this way the scope of international labour solidarity was augmented through GSP 
petitions (Tsogas 2000, p. 360).
In the historical context, in many cases the only threat of blocking imports to the US 
was enough to reform legislation in a country that violated fundamental employment 
rights. For example, the eventuality of having GSP privileges withdrawn contributed 
to changing labour laws in many countries, such as: Indonesia, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Dominican Republic (Douglas, Ferguson, Klett 2004, pp. 277–284, 288–291), Costa 
Rica, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka. The authorites of these countries significantly improved 
labour legislation and increased inspection according to the American recommenda-
tions (Ojeda-Avilés 2015, p. 111).
On the other hand, the example of the suspension of GSP for Bangladesh in June 2013 
(after the collapse of the Rana Plaza complex in Dacca, which killed over 1,100 textile 
workers) is not so obvious in the context of elimination of violations of workers’ rights. 
Contrary to the EU, Bangladesh’s garment exports did not benefit much under the US 
GSP programme. For this reason, the suspension of the US GSP was neither turning 
point nor catalysts for change. Labour rights violations did not stop after the tragedy. If 
the EU’s GSP had been suspended, the effect would have been more significant (Myant 
2017, p. 48; The International Corporate Accountability Roundtable 2018).
What refers to further imperfections of the US GSP, including its effectiveness, the 
first doubts appear on the background of the formulation: “has not taken or is not taking 
steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights.” There are some major ambi-
guities in this formulation, especially vague expressions, i.e. “taking steps,” “afford” or 
unclear criteria for withdraw GSP benefits (Church Albertson, Compa 2015, p. 475). It 
would seem more reasonable to use the terminology developed by the ILO. The category 
of “international labour standards” or “labour rights” could be adopted with the aim of 
giving substance to the currently existing unclear expressions. Unfortunately, the US leg-
islation effectively guards against any reference to the ILO standards (Alston 1996, p. 74).
1 https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr1625/BILLS-115hr1625enr.pdf (access: 9 January 2020).
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Furthermore, it should be noted that in principle strong political interference has 
always been a characteristic of the administration of the US GSP scheme (Hyde 2006, 
p. 166). The GSP political nature is firmly confirmed by the most recent studies which 
indicate that while the US’s political friends are equally likely to be investigated, they 
are much less likely to have their benefits suspended (Gassebner, Gnutzmann-Mkrt-
chyan 2018, pp. 10–13).
A matter of enforcement of the labour rights eligibility criteria is another prob-
lem. A few implementation gaps for which the enforcement is so weak can be identi-
fied. Firstly, there is considerable discretion in deciding on the GSP eligibility without 
much taking into account, e.g. the national economic-interest waiver (according to the 
Trade Act) or the lack of minimum standards of compliance in the beneficiary country. 
Secondly, the review of country compliance petitions remains plagued by very poor 
transparency. Thirdly, there are neither clear standards nor timeline for determining 
non-compliance. Moreover, the abuse of the continuing review process makes itself felt. 
It comes down to placing countries on an indefinite probation while they continue to 
benefit from preferential treatment. Fourthly, the reinstatement criteria applied after 
the revocation of GSP eligibility may require to be emphasised as they are subject to 
political assessment and remain to a great extent ineffective (The International Corpo-
rate Accountability Roundtable 2018).
In this respect it should be noted that in October 2017, USTR Robert Lighthizer 
announced new enforcement priorities for GSP, i.e. a new effort to ensure beneficia-
ry countries are meeting the eligibility criteria of the GSP trade preference program. 
However, it is still doubtful whether these reforms will really contribute to overcome 
all disadvantages.
3. The EU Generalised System of Preferences
3.1. Legal basis
In the case of the EU, the GSP has been applied since 1971 and has entailed lower tariffs 
to developing countries on some or all the EU imports from them. Regulation (EU) No 
978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying 
a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008 is currently in force for a period of ten years as from 1 January 2014. It con-
sists of only three arrangements:
1. A general arrangement (Standard GSP) for developing countries that have not 
achieved high or upper middle income status (18 beneficiary countries have to comply 
with the principles set out in the eight ILO core conventions and seven UN conven-
tions on human rights);
2. A special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance 
(GSP+) for Standard GSP beneficiaries that are also considered vulnerable (8 beneficiaries 
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have to ratify and implement 27 international conventions on human and labour rights, 
environment and good governance);
3. A special arrangement for the least developed countries (LDCs) (Everything But 
Arms, EBA) (49 beneficiaries) (Report from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment and the Council on the application of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 applying 
a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008, EUR-Lex 52018DC0665).
As regards sanctions in case of violations, all preferential arrangements mentioned 
above may be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originat-
ing in a beneficiary country, for any of the reasons included in the Regulation (EU) No 
978/2012, e.g.: serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the core hu-
man and labour rights UN/ILO Conventions or export of goods made by prison labour. 
According to Art. 21 of the Regulation, a beneficiary country should provide adminis-
trative cooperation as required for the implementation and policing of the preferential 
arrangements. The lack of such a cooperation may also entail temporary withdrawal of 
the preferential arrangements provided for in the Regulation.
In regard to GSP+, the Regulation also stipulates that “.  .  . the Commission shall 
keep under review the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and shall moni-
tor their effective implementation, as well as cooperation with the relevant monitoring 
bodies . .  .” (Art. 13). It means that granting GSP+ benefits entails continuous moni-
toring of the GSP+ beneficiaries’ obligations. Each GSP+ beneficiary receives a List of 
Issues—the so-called “scorecard”—prepared by the Commission in order to measure 
the compliance with their commitments. The document identifies serious weaknesses 
which should be purged. Above all, it contains deficiencies referred to by the Commis-
sion in its assessment of the GSP+ entry applications. Moreover, the irregularities de-
tected by the monitoring bodies of the relevant core international conventions are also 
included in said document. And over time, other information can be added to the List 
of Issues, delivered not only by the European Parliament and the Council but also by 
stakeholders, e.g. business, civil society or social partners.2
The so-called “GSP+ dialogue” is another tool in the framework of the monitoring 
mechanism for GSP+. It consists quite simply in the fact that the Commission and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) establish a dialogue on GSP+ compliance with 
the beneficiary countries, trying to bring to their notice the areas indicated in the List 
of Issues.3 As pointed out by Manfred Weiss, the aim of the GSP+ dialogue is “to build 
a relationship based on trust and cooperation” (2018, p. 124).




3.2. Pros and cons
According to the above-mentioned Report from the Commission to the European Par-
liament and the Council on the application of Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 applying 
a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 
732/2008, an overall positive impact of the GSP on social development and human rights 
in the beneficiary countries is noticeable. It has been highlighted that the most recent 
version of GSP has contributed to the promotion of sustainable development and good 
governance, especially thanks to the EU’s enhanced monitoring of the implementation 
of the international conventions relating to GSP+. Clear examples are given to illustrate 
these observations. First, in accordance with the commitment formulated in the Com-
munication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Trade for all: 
Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy,” the Commission and the High 
Representative have increased their involvement with certain EBA beneficiary countries 
with the aim of contributing to EU efforts to ensure respect of fundamental human and 
labour rights. Second, GSP has exerted a profound positive influence on the role of women 
in society. For instance, in the textile and clothing sectors (in Bangladesh and Pakistan) 
this could have been achieved by creating employment opportunities for women and by 
improving participation of women in the labour force in export industries trading with 
the EU. Third, it has been demonstrated that the EU’s leverage in countries that benefit 
from GSP+ has been increased due to the close monitoring of them. More specifically, 
this refers to the power of pushing these countries towards the effective implementation 
of the 27 relevant international conventions. Besides, it has created the opportunities for 
truly constructive dialogue and has enabled the EU to engage with beneficiary countries 
on all areas which are marked by poor and ineffective implementation.
However, as they are developed and applied unilaterally, GSP labour clauses—also in 
the case of the EU—may entail a danger of having double standard practices. A coun-
try which has introduced a GSP labour clause is the only decision-maker on which 
country and when would be subject to a GSP investigation and may eventually be ex-
cluded from trade benefits (Bronstein 2009, p. 110). Thus, unequal treatment is used in 
comparable circumstances. It has been pointed out that we are dealing here with a “di-
chotomy between norms and interests,” which means that in determining whether to 
enforce norms, the EU is motivated by its own interest (Beke, Hachez 2015, p. 193). In 
fact, many observers claim that the EU uses the GSP scheme discretionally and instru-
mentally with the purpose of pursuing foreign policy goals rather than for safeguard-
ing labour rights (Velluti 2015, p. 50). We must realise that general safeguards common 
to all arrangements are indeed a manifestation of protectionism and they are designed 
to protect “EU producers of like or directly competing products.”4 It is thereby evident 
4 The general safeguards are regulated under Art. 22–28 of the Regulation (EU) No 978/2012. By the 
letter of the law, where a product originating in a beneficiary country is imported in volumes and/or at 
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that the confines of this arrangement should be sought in purely economic calculations 
(Weiss 2018, p. 127).
The EU’s GSP labour provisions has already been used in Myanmar’s case (with-
drawal from the whole scheme). It was deprived of trade privileges because of the 
widespread use of forced labour by the government (Novitz 2018, pp. 126–127). 
A similar method was deployed in case of trade union rights infringements in Be-
larus. However, this did not give rise to any significant policy change regarding 
labour standards (Zhou, Cuyvers 2011, pp. 64, 77–78). Benefits have been also 
withdrawn in 2010 against Sri Lanka (withdrawal from GSP+) (Beke, Hachez 2015, 
p. 192; Yap 2015, pp. 224–227), which failed to implement human right conven-
tions. Of course, there have been many more occasions to suspend GSP preferences, 
e.g. decision-makers have debated such a step in regard to China, Russia, Pakistan 
and India (Portela, Orbie 2014, p. 64). However, it has never materialised. The rare 
enforcement of conditionality provisions has become an impulse for further criti-
cism, which is focused on imbalance between positive and negative conditionality 
(the former used widely, and the latter only to a minor extent) (Beke, Hachez 2015, 
p. 192). In this type of argument, it is worth remembering that supporters of EU 
sanctions highlight their positive consequences, which even go further beyond the 
sanctioned country. Weifeng Zhou and Ludo Cuyvers emphasise that sanctions can 
be perceived as contributing to “the international definition, promulgation, recog-
nition, and domestic internalization of human rights norms.” They believe in the 
sanction’s deterrent potential, i.e. that other countries refrain from violating human 
rights. Moreover, sanctions are seen by the authors as an institutionalised expres-
sion of the EU’s commitment to core labour standards (2011, p. 78). This apotheosis, 
however, cannot obscure the fact that trade measures can cause a lot of harm and, 
as a general rule, should be used with particular caution. Sometimes postulates are 
developed for impact assessment before imposing sanctions. Negative condition-
ality and sanctions can only be considered as the final solution because “it hurts 
populations more than it does the government that violate human rights” (Beke, 
Hachez 2015, pp. 192–193).
It should be noted that the idea behind the Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 was to 
solve many of these problems. In particular, the latest reforms have reduced the num-
ber of eligible beneficiary countries to 75. Consequently, the Commission will be able 
to focus only on those that are most in need of help and, what is important, deserve 
it (Yap 2015, p. 217). Next, the rules of the Regulation are devised so as to contribute 
to allaying the criticism connected to the lack of legal security, objectivity, stability, 
predictability and transparecy in the GSP scheme. Procedural simplification and en-
hanced monitoring can help to level out these defects (Beke, Hachez 2015, p. 196). As 
rightly stated by Clara Portela and Jan Orbie, the Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 places 
prices which cause, or threaten to cause, serious difficulties to EU producers of like or directly compet-
ing products, normal Common Customs Tariff duties on that product may be reintroduced (Art. 22 § 1).
Aneta Tyc
122
a stronger focus on guaranteeing compliance in comparison to the previous regulation, 
which concentrated on the ratification requirement leaving behind the implementa-
tion of the conventions (2014, p. 66).
4.  Concluding remarks: A comparison between the EU’s and the US’s 
GSP scheme
The presented characteristics of the US and the EU systems reveal some important dif-
ferences between them. The issue at the forefront of the discussion is connected to their 
motivation. The operation of the US GSP scheme, relying much on a sanction-based 
strategy, is often referred to as “aggressive unilateralism” and is in contrast to the EU 
approach called “soft unilateralism” (Church Albertson, Compa 2015, p. 476). The latter 
is mainly motivated by the will to ensure that poor countries have preferential access to 
the EU market. The linking of trade liberalisation with, inter alia, protection of work-
ers’ rights plays an important role in the whole concept. Clearly, even if protectionism 
is not the central part of the EU’s approach, economic calculations are also taken into 
consideration. This is explicitly reflected in the provisions related to general safeguards 
common to all arrangements.
The EU’s GSP scheme has been applied since 1971 and has been governed by a num-
ber of regulations. By way of comparison, the US GSP program was implemented in 
1976, and must be periodically renewed by the Congress. What is important, only the 
US GSP program is designed to give organisations the possibility to file petitions with 
the office of the USTR in the framework of the GSP petition process. Thus, organisa-
tions can ask the US government to verify the state of compliance with labour rights 
in a given country in order to decide about the possibility of the suspension of its GSP 
privileges. In the case of the EU, stakeholders can deliver information which can only 
be added to the List of Issues.
Making further comparisons, it is important that the US GSP legislation has adopt-
ed the concept of “internationally recognized worker rights,” and the EU GSP scheme 
has adopted the ILO core labour standards. The first four of “internationally recognized 
worker rights” practically coincide with those of the ILO Declaration. However, it should 
be noted that the elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation, which 
is present in the ILO Declaration, has not been included in the US’s law. On the other 
hand, the US has included acceptable conditions of work with respect to wages, hours 
of work, and occupational health and safety. Layna Mosley and Lindsay Tello suggest 
that it can be interpreted softly as “a difference in emphasis,” or more acutely as “an in-
dication of the contestation that surrounds the specifics of labour rights” (2015, p. 65). 
It finds confirmation in the fact that the US withdrew from the ILO in November 1977 
because of selective concern for human rights, the erosion of tripartitism, disregard of 
due process, and because the ILO was becoming too “politicized,” and allowing political 
campaigning against the US and Western nations generally (Peel 1979, p. 46). Naturally, 
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during the 1980s, the US was not willing to make references to ILO conventions in its 
labour legislation.
It must be also observed here, that the EU requires developing countries to comply 
only with conventions which have been ratified by EU Member States. Obviously, in 
the case of the US the situation is quite different. The US has ratified only 14 of 190 ILO 
Conventions including only two of the ILO’s core labour standards—Convention No. 
105 (on forced labour) and Convention No. 182 (on the worst forms of child labour). 
Conventions concerning wages, hours of work or occupational safety and health (ex-
cept Convention No. 176 on safety and health in mines) have not been ratified.
As Weiss rightly points out, the US and the EU differ also in their approach with 
regard to the functioning of the monitoring system. The EU GSP scheme, in contrast 
to the US, has introduced in its system a clear link between the EU monitoring proce-
dure and the “case law” of the ILO’s and the UN’s monitoring bodies. Besides, refusal 
or withdrawal of preferences must be preceded, in the case of the EU, by transparent 
and fair procedures (2018, p. 127). It has been also demonstrated that due to the EU’s 
enhanced monitoring of the implementation of the international conventions relating 
to GSP+, the most recent version of GSP has contributed to the promotion of sustain-
able development and good governance.
Taking into consideration, inter alia, the use of aggressive unilateralism, the term 
“internationally recognized worker rights,” the monitoring system functioning, the ap-
proach towards ratification of ILO’s core labour conventions, the desirable effective-
ness, the Trump Administration’s recent steps relating to certain beneficiary countries, 
it seems clear that the EU system pretends to be far better organised. However, it is 
doubtful if the US would ever take a cue from the EU. 
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